




Large Hadron Collider (LHC)

- 7+7 TeV proton-proton collider
- Injection from the SPS at 450 GeV
- Full fill per beam 3.23×10¹⁴ protons (2808 bunches)
- 1232 superconducting main dipoles and 392 quadrupoles at 1.9 K with superfluid-He cooling by 120 metric tons of helium
- Main tunnel of 26.7 km circumference,
 ~100 m underground
- 4 large experiments at interaction points (ATLAS, ALICE, CMS, LHCb)
- 6 small experiments (LHCf, FASER, SND, TOTEM, MilliQAN, MoEDAL)
- 8 main and 2 minor sites, 26 vertical shafts (including 2 new HL-LHC shafts not shown)
- Commissioned in 2008







LHC Access Control System (LACS)

- Manages personnel and material access to the underground areas:
 - Identification (RFID badge)
 - Authorization (granted to specific areas, mandatory trainings, work authorization)
 - Authentication (biometric iris-scan)
- 36 access points
- 43 Personnel Access Devices (PAD)
- 29 Material Access Devices (MAD)

LHC Access Safety System (LASS)

- Protects personnel from the hazards by the beam (radiation) and He-release (asphyxiation, cryogenic hazards)
- "If beam, no persons. If persons, no beam"
- Access modes: General, Restricted, Closed
- Comprehensive interlock system with two separate and diverse safety chains, PLC and cabled



MAD Safety token Instrument Intercom PAD Iris reader distributors rack Badge reader Touch panel





Motivation for the Upgrade

- Old LACS software and hardware at end-of-life availability of support and spares limited
- Monolithic design: hard to carry out modifications to the subsystems without side-effects
- Upgrade only possible during long LHC shutdowns
 not feasible to postpone
- MAD replacement required at 4 sites to match lift dimensions
- Synergy advantages coupled with simultaneous LASS modifications

LASS Consolidation and Modifications

- Reliability and availability improvements
- Sectorization modifications (new PZ65 access point, MilliQAN experiment)
- New HL-LHC emergency exit sectors
- Small safety improvements on all sites

System Design

- New access control software and hardware
- New simplified operator interface
- Full automation upgrade: 49 access point racks, 18 sector door racks, 2 central control racks
- Subsystems: central control, door control, access control, access points, video surveillance, interphones, biometry, MAD detection
- Main design principle: minimal integration between subsystems for maximum flexibility in O&M and upgrades








Access Point Automation

- Most functionality controlled by a Siemens 1500 series access point PLC:
 - Connected to the central PLC
 - PAD and MAD operational cycles
 - Safety token distributors (in Restricted access mode) – safety inputs to LASS
 - Interface to Local Control Unit (UTL) for access control (person identification) connected to its own server
 - Biometric authentication by an IrisID iCAM
 7000 iris reader
 - A future reservation for an active dosimeter reader (DMC) interface
- Access point touch panel / PC for user interface functionality and information display
- MAD personnel detection algorithm runs in the local access point PC








YCA01=PM85 (Weeks 02-04 – 2020)

Project Planning and Execution

- Design and preparation 2015-2016
- Detailed specification 2017
- Prototyping 2018 a full system prototype in the LHC access system off-line test bench
- Execution planning 2018
 - Close collaboration with LHC coordination to fix installation slot for each site
 - A widely distributed compensatory measures plan for all the stakeholders
 - Obligation to maintain access control even when an access point dismantled
 - Old and new systems coexisted during project
- Pilot installation of the new PZ65 access point in 2018 – debug installation procedure
- Upgrade of experiment non-interlocked access points early 2019 – team training
- Main installation project 2019-2020 + a COVID-19induced extension to 2021







Verification and Validation

- Rigorous regime of testing all newly installed and modified equipment
 - 1. Cabling and point-to-point functionality Contractor
 - 2. Local automation and signal transmission Contractor
 - 3. Site-wide functional verification CERN team
 - 4. Local functional validation DSO
 - 5. Global functional verification CERN team
 - 6. Global functional validation DSO
- All safety elements validated by CERN Departmental Safety Officers (DSO)
- Access and safety system tests are disruptive even local verification tests can block several sites
- Tests started in January 2020 and everything except the global tests (steps 5 and 6) have been completed

Conclusions

- The upgrade project went very smoothly: Thanks to all the stakeholders!
- Early planning and adaptability is essential
- For testing, simulation of missing elements essential, and the capability should be built-in from the start

